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1. Introduction
The development of technology and research in the 
twentieth century is rife with controversies. Examples 
include: global warming, nuclear power (fusion and 
fission), genetically modified organisms (GMOs), current 
research on shale gas (fracking), synthetic biology, geo-
engineering proposals, developments in Information and 
Communication Technologies, not to mention the scandal 
of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). These new 
issues have triggered strong public reactions, and have 
increased the need to find new methods to monitor, control, 
organize and shape innovation in science and technology. 
In recent years, these new methods have evolved into the 
political formulation of responsible research and innovation 
(RRI) in Europe (EC, 2013).
The idea of science and technology meeting societal 
values is not new. RRI furthers different traditions, which 
originated in bioethics, in ethical committees focused on 
various technologies (biomedicine, ICT), and in technology 
assessment (TA) and participatory technological assessment 
(PTA) practices. Furthermore, RRI continues the ethical 
reflection on technology and research, as framed by ethical 
legal and social impacts and assessment (ELSI and ELSA) 
initiatives which emerged in the early 2000s at the height 
of the controversy over the development of genomics. In 
addition, reflections on corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and sustainable development have also paved the 
way for the inclusion of ethics in the shaping of technology. 
From a reconstructive point of view, one could argue that 
RRI brings together the democratic stance of PTA and the 
idea of responsibility contained in CSR. It furthers these 
different traditions (which have been evolving in parallel 
worlds) and embraces the inter-disciplinarity initiated by 
PTA and ethical committees (which respectively involved 
experts from computer sciences, ICT, the political sciences, 
sociology and management sciences and from bioethics, 
philosophy, theology, law and medicine).
Compared to PTA, designed as a pluralist attempt to build 
normative assessment, or to ELSI whose approaches are 
based on expert driven ethical evaluation, RRI theories 
link social and ethical desirability to the ‘responsibility’ 
of those involved in innovation and research processes 
(scientists, innovators, policy makers, interest groups, end-
users, etc.). Authors such as Guston (2004), Grunwald 
(2011), Stilgoe et al. (2013), Owen et al. (2012, 2013b) and 
Von Schomberg (2013), or a report from the European 
Commission published in 2013 (EC, 2013b), have gathered 
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recommendations already promoted in TA approaches 
together and proposed several conditions for RRI to be 
operative: anticipation, transparency, reflexivity, public 
participation and responsiveness, which is only one possible 
meaning of responsibility. Although this approach shifts 
the focus from an explicit ethical enquiry towards the idea 
of responsibility, the concept has remained surprisingly 
under-investigated in RRI literature from a theoretical 
point of view. Von Schomberg (2013) for instance offers 
some insight when he analyses cases of ‘irresponsibility’. 
Yet, the very definition of ‘responsibility’ (of who, to whom, 
where, when, in what way) has never been considered 
systematically, although this vagueness hinders RRI’s 
practical relevance.
In order to fill this gap, we will investigate some of the many 
dimensions of the concept. However, we will not advocate 
a single normative understanding of responsibility. On the 
contrary, we will defend a pluralistic conceptual view thus 
avoiding, on the one hand, a monistic approach (where a 
single moral element – or hierarchy of normative elements – 
is relevant) and, on the other hand, a relativistic perspective 
(dependent on non-moral reasons, that are factors or causes 
only), which would eclipse the normative discussion (Reber 
and Sève, 2006).
Section 1 briefly presents a short genesis of RRI, identifying 
two main perspectives: the ‘pillars’ supported by the 
European Commission on the one hand and a more 
procedural approach focused on the ‘conditions’ for RRI 
to be operative on the other. We underline some of the 
issues raised by the current under-determination of both 
frameworks, which stems from their theoretical weakness 
in defining responsibility.
It should be mentioned here that most RRI approaches do 
not distinguish between research and innovation. Both sets 
of practices are considered on the same level, an approach 
which neglects their respective specificities and constraints, 
such as differences in the hierarchy of their aims, their 
respective temporalities and their different sensitivities 
regarding the assessment of potential damage. Focusing 
on supply chains and networks, we will confine ourselves 
to studying the link between innovation and responsibility 
(responsible innovation; RI). This approach does not deny 
that research is also an important part of RRI.
Hence, to deepen our understanding of the concept of 
responsibility, Section 2 considers the case of CSR in which 
responsibility is conceived of in the specific context of 
business practices. The particular constraints of innovation 
(such as the need for secrecy or the complexity of supply 
chains in multinational organizations) contradict the 
fundamental conditions laid out by certain RRI analysts, 
and particularly transparency and responsiveness. More 
generally, with the exception of Blok and Lemmens (2015), 
Pavie et al. (2014) and the special issue of this journal, the 
business context has been largely neglected in RRI literature. 
In revisiting the idea of responsibility implemented in 
CSR, we will highlight elements that might inspire a more 
practical view of RI in supply chains.
We nonetheless argue that CSR does not fully exhaust the 
question of responsibility in innovation. Taking a closer look 
at moral philosophy, Section 3 offers a general conceptual 
mapping of the different meanings of responsibility to add 
to the literature on both CSR and RI. We distinguish between 
negative and positive understandings of responsibility, i.e. 
between a passive approach to responsibility, focusing on 
damage and sanctions, and an active understanding that 
seeks to prevent harm and identify more positive outcomes. 
The promoting of a positive and proactive approach is 
designed to alleviate alleged tensions between innovation 
and responsibility (which are sometimes depicted as 
forming an oxymoron).
Finally, Section 4 illustrates how the different meanings of 
responsibility can be combined in RI. One main issue relates 
to the question of how responsibility is distributed along 
a complex supply chain and attributed to specific actors. 
Useful work has been carried out by moral and political 
philosophers and law theorists, when, for instance, they 
focus on the tension between causal determinism and 
freedom, or on the definition of control, secure competence 
and negligence (i.e. Raz, 2011). However, this work, which 
focuses on personal moral responsibility, has not yet been 
translated into an RI framework. We therefore scrutinize 
the practical relevance of meanings of responsibility in the 
context of innovation in supply chains and innovation 
networks, to offer a moral understanding of chained or 
networked responsibilities. To improve RI implementation, 
we discuss in what contexts some of the meanings of 
responsibility best apply and how they help to conceptualize 
responsibility in supply chains and networks.
2.  Different conceptions of responsible
innovation
Adopting a schematic perspective, two main approaches 
to RRI that combine various factors or pillars can be 
distinguished.
The first approach aims to improve the societal alignment 
of research and innovation by enhancing different factors 
selected and promoted by the European Commission: (1) 
citizen engagement and participation of societal actors in 
research and innovation; (2) science literacy and scientific 
education; (3) gender equality in research and innovation 
and the gender dimension in research and innovation 
content; (4) open access to scientific knowledge, research 
results and data; (5) research and innovation governance 
(including ethics) (EC, 2013a). These five factors or 
dimensions of the ‘Science in Society’ programme are 
designed to better align research and innovation outcomes 
with the values, needs and expectations of European society 
and to ensure that the aims of European research and 
innovation potential are realised.
The first of the many issues raised by this approach, is that 
the EC has presented the five pillars without relating them to 
the goal they are expected to achieve: the pillars themselves 
are helpful, but there is no mention of how they will reveal 
the values and needs of society and how they will ensure ‘a 
better alignment’ of interests. Secondly, European citizens 
are divided about certain types of innovation. The five pillars 
could undoubtedly contribute to starting and organizing 
debate, as PTA procedures do, but further work on their 
coherency is needed to deal with the conflicts resulting from 
the heterogeneity of European societies. Thirdly, and most 
importantly for our argument, the brackets surrounding 
the word ‘ethics’ in the phrasing of the fifth pillar are worth 
pointing out: they seem to suggest that ethics is included in 
or restricted to governance, i.e. that the normative dimension 
of research and innovation (R&I) are not investigated per 
se, but diluted in the social and political processes through 
which science and technology are dealt with and monitored. 
Such a conception of RRI would be very limited: it would 
neglect a prominent dimension of ethics, i.e. our links with 
the external world (including inter-human relationships, 
but also the environment and non-human beings, etc.). 
In addition, ethics deals with many other issues beyond 
governance or cooperation, as illustrated by the debates in 
meta-ethics on values motivation, the field of individual 
ethics or the debate surrounding the notion of responsibility 
in moral philosophy – which never broach the issue of 
governance (i.e. McKenna, 2012; Raz, 2011).
Based on a more procedural framework, the second approach 
to RRI focuses on the conditions that R&I processes should 
satisfy in order to be considered as responsible (Armstrong 
et al., 2012; Barben et al., 2008; Grunwald, 2011; Guston, 
2006; Hellstrom, 2003; Lee, 2012; Owen et al., 2009, 2012, 
2013b; Von Schomberg, 2011a,b). Not all authors focus on 
the same conditions and the number of conditions and 
content differ. However, five dimensions are more frequently 
investigated: anticipation (using traditional rational tools 
but also narratives and scenarios as a way to deal with 
uncertainty), responsiveness (conceived of as constant 
adaptation to a changing environment), reflexivity (thought 
of as the ability to challenge the framing through which 
assessments and decisions are made, inclusion (which calls 
for participation and sometimes deliberation as a possible 
means to align science and technology with societal values) 
and transparency (i.e. the need to circulate knowledge).
This approach seeks to improve the skills of individual, 
social, institutional and organisational players involved 
in R&I as well as the systemic qualities of research and 
innovation processes, so that their developments gain 
legitimacy by becoming embedded in the public’s normative 
beliefs (i.e. values and value systems). Compared to the 
EC pillars that indicate general requisites, this perspective 
is based on the more abstract qualities of R&I. Thus, the 
issue of compatibility between both sets of factors remains 
unresolved. Furthermore, this approach raises other 
questions related to the implementation of R&I norms, the 
quality of deliberation and participation, the definition and 
realisation of reflexivity and the particular conceptions of 
responsibility used (Pellé and Reber, 2016; Pellé et al., 2013). 
Finally, the procedural overtone of the second approach 
does not offer much more than the EC pillars regarding the 
ways in which ethical issues are identified and resolved. The 
assumption is that the ethical dimensions of R&I emerge 
from reflexivity, responsiveness, inclusion, etc. However, 
the practical correspondence between these conditions 
and ethical outcomes and justifications frequently remains 
unclear: the effective ways through which reflexivity and 
inclusion lead to ethically desirable outputs remain 
debatable.
We argue that the problems encountered by both approaches 
to RRI in explicitly addressing their normative dimension, 
are due to a lack of investigation into the very concept of 
responsibility. This is surprising as such, since responsibility 
lies at the core of what RRI claims to do. The reasons 
why theorists have defined RRI without framing the idea 
of responsibility then need to be explained. The lack of 
investigation is even more unexpected when focusing on 
innovation, since the decades-old CSR framework provides 
a normative approach to consider responsibility within 
business practices. However, CSR has rarely been related to 
RRI: although Pavie et al., 2014 recently made progress in 
this respect, Owen et al. (2013a), for instance, only mentions 
CSR twice, and in unusual circumstances, in an article on RRI 
in finance. Furthermore, RRI literature rarely considers the 
specificities of the business context relevant to innovation. 
The only research that attempts to address these specific 
issues is the recent work of Blok and Lemmens (2015) and 
Pavie et al. (2014). The following section considers how CSR 
literature can help to sketch a more accurate conception of 
responsibility in innovation and supply chains, and also 
what RI can add to these conceptions.
3.  Social corporate responsibility and
responsible innovation
The roots of CSR first emerged before World War II. 
However, it was only in 1953 that Howard R. Bowen came 
to significantly shape future reflections on the subject in his 
seminal book, ‘Social responsibilities of the businessman’ 
published in that year, (Carroll, 2009; Carroll and Shabana, 
2010; Melé, 2009; Spector, 2008). Three core ideas about 
CSR stood out at that time: the idea of the manager as public 
trustee, the balancing of competing claims for corporate 
resources within the company, and corporate philanthropy 
– business supporting worthy causes (Frederick, 2009). The
literature then expanded substantially from the 1960s until 
the end of the 1980s. It tended to focus on the question 
of what social responsibility actually meant and its 
importance to business and society. Different dimensions 
were investigated including corporate social performance 
and how it was assessed (how to measure and asses a private 
company’s activities), stakeholder theory (focused on the 
relationships between private companies and all relevant 
stakeholders such as local communities, NGOs, policy 
makers and ‘civil society’), and corporate citizenship (the 
firm being considered as a citizen with moral and legal 
duties and rights).
These perspectives differ in their focus and their 
characterisation of CSR. However, what they all have in 
common is the idea of responsibility as a way to extend 
the horizon of private corporations beyond their traditional 
profit maximization behaviour and encouraging them to 
consider the social impact of their activities. Carroll and 
Schwartz (2003), for instance, describe three connecting 
types of responsibility inherent to any company: (1) to make 
a profit; (2) to comply with national and/or international 
legal norms (e.g. Human rights, laws relating to child 
labour); (3a) to comply with existing ethical norms (e.g. 
ISO 26000, the Global Reporting Initiative), together with 
other norms recognised as socially valuable; and (3b) to 
engage in philanthropy. Noticeably, the ethical and legal 
part (complying with social and legal norms) goes hand in 
hand with the imperatives of economic efficiency. The social 
responsibility of firms implies the inclusion of variables 
other than profit in decision-making, even if the latter 
remains the primary driver.
CSR thus endeavours to envision the firm as entangled 
in a network of relationships (rather than being a purely 
autonomous agent). It extends the range of interrelations 
and impacts to be taken into consideration by corporates in 
their decision-making process, so that social, environmental 
and ethical impacts and consequences might be included. 
This attempt echoes the RI endeavour to open innovation 
and its consequences to different members of society (and 
to their potentially conflicting interests) rather than focusing 
only on economic or scientific actors. Both approaches align 
the processes of production, innovation and research with 
societal needs, interests and values. Furthermore, both 
approaches rely on the individual virtue of top managers, 
employees, innovators, etc. as well as on the systemic 
capacity of production and innovation processes to allow 
their outputs to be shaped according to ethical and social 
desirability, once specific normative constraints have been 
taken into account.
Thus, the CSR framework already provides a basis to develop 
the conception of responsibility in innovation. Pavie et 
al. (2014) for instance, scrutinize a number of issues and 
examples that show how CSR can be applied practically. It 
can shape innovation by challenging the private company’s 
ceaseless quest for new goods, through a careful monitoring 
of a product’s life cycle, or by anticipating and monitoring 
the medium and long terms consequences of a given 
product on health, lifestyle, or on the environment. CSR has 
also crystallized into a practical set of norms (ISO 260000), 
which effectively guide corporate governance. Finally, CSR 
sheds light on the complex issue of how responsibility is 
shared among supply chain actors. One example of this is 
when companies manage to impose CSR constraints on 
their partners’ practices (e.g. Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 
2009; Carter and Jennings, 2002). Another example is when 
corporate responsibility is restricted to a ‘circle of influence’ 
(i.e. the actions of main suppliers and stakeholders that a 
corporate entity can seek to influence, without having total 
control over) in order to allow the company to maintain 
its autonomy (Amaeshi et al., 2008). In conceiving of the 
firm and its various stakeholders as an ecosystem, the CSR 
approach may well be useful for the implementation of RI’s 
main features (i.e. responsiveness, anticipation, inclusion 
or reflexivity).
However, two issues that have only been partially tackled 
by CSR need to be addressed in the context of RI. The first 
of these is that CSR is sometimes based on too optimistic a 
vision of knowledge and rationality, where the outcomes of 
acts and decisions are seen to be identifiable and predictable. 
However, the intrinsic uncertainty of technological 
development, in which innovation plays a major role, 
means that CSR fails to fully deal with unpredictable and/
or unknown outcomes. Responsibility does not only rely 
on anticipatory capacities or the efficiency of knowledge 
production. An adequate conception of responsibility also 
morally engages individuals and organizations by virtue 
of their actions, whatever the consequences might be. This 
is true even if consequentialism is not fully renounced, i.e. 
if the actual consequences (and not only those that can 
be foreseen) of corporate activities are considered. For 
instance, compared to CSR, views of responsibility as care 
or responsiveness (Grinbaum and Groves, 2013), connect 
a moral commitment with our capacities of anticipation in 
contexts of attendant uncertainty.
Another limitation of CSR is the fact that in practice, firms 
tend to implement a restrictive conception of responsibility 
that is limited to compliance with existing norms. Studies 
on how CSR is carried out in the field of nanotechnology, 
(Groves et al., 2011; Kuzma and Kuzhabekova, 2011a,b) 
emphasise that firms tend to conform to agreed standards 
but fail to adapt to new situations created by innovation. 
They tend not to adopt a proactive approach, on occasions 
when they should anticipate future developments 
and elaborate norms related to them. This is not to say 
that innovative business is not normally adaptive (c.f. 
Chesbrough’s open innovation paradigm, for instance), or 
that CSR in itself hinders proactive approaches. However, 
what RI specifically addresses is a concern for moral 
innovation, in which adaptation to a changing environment 
implies reconsidering ethical, social and environmental 
assessments beyond mere compliance with existing norms, 
something that has not gained enough attention yet.
In other words, CSR has initiated a conception of 
responsibility among economic actors, which goes beyond 
their own economic benefit. However, it partly fails to 
take up the challenges of actual innovation and research, 
especially with regard to the way in which uncertainty 
is managed and ethical and social issues identified and 
possibly answered. In order to go beyond an implementation 
of RI that would be 'naive' according to Blok and Lemmens 
(2015), the epistemic question of the production of norms 
needs to be tackled (Pellé and Reber, 2016; Pellé et al., 2013). 
Moreover, according to the European Commission, CSR 
could well become an additional RRI pillar (together with 
other factors already mentioned in EC calls for research 
projects, such as digital science, open science and open 
science education; scientific foresight and future TA, and 
social innovation), expressing the idea that RRI and RI have 
a wider scope than the concept of CSR.
4.  Responsibility in responsible innovation:
moral philosophy perspectives
Both the CSR framework and current RI literature are limited 
by their inexplicit conception of responsibility. And yet, 
moral philosophy provides at least ten or eleven different 
meanings of the concept, offering a variety of pathways 
for practical implementation. As synthetically, but only 
partially, presented by Van de Poel (2011), responsibility 
can be understood as a: (1) role; (2) task; (3) capacity; 
(4) authority; (5) virtue (care); (6) responsiveness; (7) 
obligation; (8) accountability; (9) blameworthiness; and 
(10) liability (our emphasis). Some authors add 11) causes 
or outcomes (Hart, 1968; Vincent, 2011), making both 
meanings equal (Perry, 2000). However, responsibility as a 
cause raises difficulties in moral philosophy as the freedom 
of either an individual or a collective entity is shelved 
when a deterministic conception of action is adopted 
(Fischer, 1999).
These various meanings can be divided into two different 
groups: the first one includes a ‘negative’ understanding of 
responsibility (in which actions are based on the threat of 
sanction), while the second set of meanings invokes a more 
prospective and positive understanding of responsibility, 
where future oriented players are concerned with certain 
courses of events happening (or not happening). Not all 
meanings are equally relevant for RI.
Negative meanings of responsibility
The first common interpretation of responsibility involves 
the attribution to a given individual or entity of acts carried 
out by them, which have had a negative outcome or have 
caused damage, which must now be compensated for or 
repaired. This imputative conception allows a distinction to 
be made between blameworthiness (when A can be blamed 
for outcome X, for instance, a car accident) and liability 
(A is liable to pay for the damages caused by outcome X). 
Negative understandings of responsibility also include a 
passive form of accountability (Bovens, 1998). These various 
approaches are backward looking, in that the responsibility 
is retrospectively assessed. The type of responsibility is 
external to individuals, because it relies on norms coming 
from the outside, which only influence the individual’s acts 
through the threat of sanctions. This leads to a ‘negative’ 
conception of responsibility which is insufficient when 
considering innovation (and research) because: (1) it fails 
to include a normative involvement; (2) it may dilute 
responsibility; (3) it is understood to be without agent; and 
(4) it is restricted to the notion of external accountability.
Lack of normative involvement. Reducing the meaning of 
responsibility to liability alone creates a dilemma, which 
stems from the fact that the conditions for establishing 
one’s responsibility rely too strongly on the burden of 
proof (Pellizzoni, 2004). To impute future damage on the 
basis of the knowledge available plays a part in building 
a purely instrumental view of responsibility. Not only is 
regulation rarely able to catch up with the development of 
technology (Lee and Jose, 2008; Owen et al., 2013b), but 
complying with the law is only part of the comprehensive 
normative involvement of individuals since their behaviour 
will only be affected by fear of financial or legal penalties. 
For instance, complying with national safety legislation on 
nanotechnology or with the European Charter of Human 
Rights as claimed by Von Schomberg (2013) provides 
a first set of constraints on industrial innovation. It 
functions as a minimal requirement before setting a morally 
responsible production process in motion. However, ethical 
responsibility extends beyond a purely legal interpretation 
of responsibility since the law can be unethical (e.g. 
historical examples of legal slavery), and ethical behaviour 
can be illegal (e.g. Antigone’s uncompromising refusal of the 
king’s law, or the recent case of the whistle blower Edward 
Snowden, who publicly reported classified information, 
which violated US national security law). Moreover, the 
moral sphere of responsibility begins before and goes 
beyond legal frontiers; ethical concerns frequently arise 
before new laws have been discussed or enacted, as in 
the case of contentious interpretations of biotechnology. 
Interestingly, while the kind of responsibility involved in 
RI, PTA, CSR or sustainable development is not compulsory, 
many essays and definitions of responsibility are confusing 
on this point. We claim that RI also involves a form of moral 
innovation that adapts to changes in the environment. 
For example, safety rules will not always prevent possible 
harmful outcomes and RI also needs to go beyond available 
knowledge to develop and anticipate ethical norms and 
normative assessments of innovation, which might differ 
from current regulations.
Diluted responsibility. The second type of problem derives 
from the individualistic overtone of negative conceptions 
of responsibility based on a strong link between individuals 
and outcomes. When it is difficult to unravel the tangles 
of the causal chains that have led to a particular set of 
unacceptable outcomes, and when responsibility can be 
ascribed to too many individuals, there is a risk that in 
fine, no one can be held responsible at all. The philosopher 
Paul Ricoeur (1995) goes a step further when he mentions 
‘adjacent effects’ that include the unexpected consequences 
of our acts. This raises the question of the extent to 
which individuals can be held responsible. A purely 
consequentialist approach to responsibility as promoted 
in liability, blameworthiness and passive approaches to 
accountability, collides with its own framework: in seeing 
responsibility as the result of a discernible causal process, 
one is confronted with the need to define the limits of 
reasonable time, space, and interaction to assess guilt. Yet, 
innovation and the attendant uncertainty surrounding it 
often challenge this rationalistic approach and require the 
way in which these limits are determined to be clarified. For 
instance, would it be possible to make someone or some 
entity (e.g. Monsanto’s CEO) financially responsible, should 
a GMO or other form of biotechnology cause damage to 
the health of human beings?
The loss of agency. The third issue is linked to the historical 
evolution of our understanding of responsibility, which 
tends to remove it from individual agency. As argued by 
Ricoeur (op.cit.), the idea of solidarity against risk that 
led to the advent of insurance systems in the 19th century 
and to the welfare state in the 20th century altered the 
understanding of responsibility as implying obligation 
and repair in the case of fault. The institutionalisation of 
the management and prevention of social risks replaced 
the idea of individuals paying for damage they caused by 
a conception of responsibility in which potential risks 
should be prevented. This passive approach to responsibility 
illustrates the disappearance of the author of the injury. Such 
a change involves thinking about responsibility in a more 
prospective way (preventing risks is also forward looking), 
but it raises the same kind of difficulty as the purely legal 
interpretation. To what extent can public institutions 
prevent risk? Taking future generations into account (as 
in sustainable development, for instance), what is the 
time frame of the risk analysis? And using this prevention 
framework, who holds responsibility for complex and 
unexpected effects?
Responsibility restricted to the notion of external accountability. 
According to Bovens (2010), there exists a negative 
understanding of accountability, linked to the provision of 
a justification for one’s actions, as when we have a moral 
obligation to account for what we did or for what happened 
(Blagescu et al., 2005; Bovens, 2010; Van de Poel, 2011). This 
corresponds to a passive way of conceiving accountability 
as a mechanism that focuses on the relationship between 
a forum and an agent, i.e. on the obligation of the agent 
‘to explain and to justify his or her conduct’ and the role 
of the forum in ‘posing questions and passing judgment’ 
(Bovens, 2010). Such a conception of accountability places 
the emphasis on political and social control and leads to an 
investigation of how accountability mechanisms function 
and what their effects are. This passive understanding of 
accountability/responsibility, which is very common in 
corporates for instance, fails to deal with research and 
innovation, as it is not conducive to the anticipation of 
future change.
Negative interpretations of responsibility – liability, 
imputation, blameworthiness and the passive form of 
accountability – are effective and necessary. However, they 
never succeed in establishing a closer connection between 
individual decisions and acts and ethics. They do not offer 
a comprehensive approach to the practices, activities and 
capacities that a more positive form of responsibility leads 
to. Looking through the prism of these positive forms, it 
becomes clear that we are driven not only by the fear of 
sanctions but also by our wish to ensure that a certain course 
of events will or will not happen.
Positive meanings of responsibility
More prospective understandings of responsibility assume 
that individuals not only make up for the possible wrong 
they have done but engage in a process through which they 
take care of others (other human beings, future generations, 
non-human beings or the environment) by their actions. 
From this perspective, what counts is no longer being held 
responsible for a past action, but assuming forward looking 
responsibility. Various aspects can be distinguished.
First, a certain kind of responsibility is involved when an 
individual is given a specific task to accomplish or a specific 
role to take on (Hart, 1968; Van de Poel, 2011). Individuals 
are assigned to these activities and must ensure that they 
operate according to the best possible standards. In a similar 
vein, another aspect of responsibility relates to authority. 
In their professional activities, individuals are responsible 
for ensuring that pre-defined tasks are performed, and 
expected outcomes reached or avoided as the case may be. 
Their responsibility covers a broadened set of activities, 
compared to that included in the definition of a task, as it 
also involves the actions and decisions of other individuals. 
A fourth level of this broad set of ‘positive’ meanings of 
responsibility relates to the capacity to be responsible. 
Individuals must not only be able to act in a desirable way 
in order to be held responsible for their actions (a necessary 
condition), they must also show a capacity to act in a correct 
and appropriate way. Finally, a fifth level implies the notion 
of moral obligation when a social actor acknowledges his 
or her moral duty to act in a certain way.
These positive conceptions of responsibility entail the 
notion of moral agency. Assuming moral agency implies 
that we have the ability to reflect on the consequences of our 
actions and that we can engage in foresight through which 
we increase our knowledge of the world and how our actions 
might interact with and alter it (Grinbaum and Groves, 
2013). This positive capacity also implies the ability to form 
intentions, to act deliberately, and to act in accordance with 
certain norms and moral or legal rules (Hart, 1968; Van de 
Poel, 2011; Grinbaum and Groves, 2013).
A further step in defining responsible innovation leads to the 
idea of virtue. Social actors can take care of and show concern 
for others and for certain courses of action. To overcome 
the deficiency of consequentialist frameworks, relationships 
based on care have been defended (Groves, 2009) and 
sometimes represented by means of a metaphor borrowed 
from the family: innovators (including entrepreneurs, 
scientists or a network of actors) should act towards their 
innovation as parents take care of their children (Grinbaum 
and Groves, 2013; Jonas, 1979). Obviously, the analogy will 
encounter some limits as the autonomy of technological 
artefacts, once they escape their creator’s control, cannot 
be compared to that of a child becoming an adult. But, 
similarly to value-sensitive design approaches (Kelty, 2009; 
Van den Hoven, 2013), defining responsibility as care 
contains an interesting feature: innovators should shape 
the design of technology and follow up its development 
in a ‘good’ way, without being tied to the obligation of 
forecasting all possible consequences.
Another way of linking backward and forward looking 
conceptions of responsibility focuses on the dynamic 
of responsibility, i.e. on the ability to adapt and change 
one’s own actions. Responsibility is then understood as 
accountability and responsiveness.
Accountability. We argued previously that a purely 
retrospective meaning of accountability did not exhaust the 
idea of responsibility. However, the idea of accountability 
also entails the active involvement of individuals as it 
associates the justifiability of decisions with the possibility 
of modifying one’s actions (Grunwald, 2011). In Bovens’ 
words, this second view refers to accountability as a ‘virtue’. 
Thus, accountability can be understood as the active 
performance of agents who take other stakeholders’ needs 
into consideration by engaging them in a learning dialogue. 
This approach stresses the ‘process of learning’ (as opposed 
to the ‘mechanism of control’) by which individuals learn to 
be responsive to each other and to adapt their behaviour in 
order to achieve ‘substantive standards of good governance.’ 
(Bovens, 2010). The role of accountability studies is then 
to formulate these substantive standards of good public 
or corporate governance and to assess whether officials 
or organisations comply with them (op. cit.). Here, the 
possibility of modifying our actions, which is logically 
impossible in negative definitions of responsibility, plays 
a major role: it places responsiveness at the forefront.
Responsiveness. Among the various approaches to 
responsiveness, Blok (2014) proposed an interesting 
conception from the phenomenological tradition 
(as opposed to dominant analytic philosophy). This 
sophisticated approach integrates dialogue and difference, 
understood in Levinas and Deetz’ terms and aims at 
making responsiveness fully responsive to the otherness 
of others. For instance, the goal of a stakeholders’ dialogue 
in RI processes is no longer the self-expression of those 
involved in order to convince others, but rather to ensure 
that participants become critical towards their own interests 
and value frames. Therefore the ideas, positions and values 
of the subject are not only prefixed as input in the dialogue. 
‘In my dialogical responsiveness to the other, my identity 
as responsive to the demands of the other is constituted. 
Because my responsiveness is always limited and biased 
by our self-referentiality, our dialogical responsiveness 
consists in the continuous enactment and performance of 
the dialogue with the other. In this way, I am primarily 
responsive to the grand challenges of our time in my effort 
to innovate in a responsible way’ (Blok, 2014, p. 17).
In conclusion, these ten different conceptions open 
different ‘worlds’ of responsibility and offer many possible 
combinations that contribute to moral innovation. All 
meanings of responsibility are not equally relevant for 
RI and we argue that the latter should connect negative 
understandings with more positive dimensions, in order 
to face the ‘grand challenges’ of modern technological 
development. Yet, the question of how these various 
conceptions of responsibility can be combined practically 
and effectively remains open. A full analysis of the relevance 
of all these dimensions in industrial innovation supply 
chains lies beyond the scope of this article, but the next 
section provides a few illustrations that may be helpful for 
further discussion on the practical implementation of RI. 
We focus on some of these understandings that have been 
less frequently explored than responsiveness, accountability 
or liability, i.e. task, role, capacity and virtue.
5.  Moral responsibility: a polysemic and
pluralist concept
As mentioned earlier, although many attempts made 
by RI and CSR proponents involve the key concept 
of responsibility, to a large extent the latter remains 
unquestioned. Strong constructivist analysts (mainly 
sociologists), expect that definitions of responsibility will 
emerge from processes and practices, rather than embracing 
a normative approach to understand the moral dimension 
encapsulated in the idea of responsibility (see Berthelot, 
2007, for a pluralist and balanced overview of different 
sociological approaches). However the constructivist 
approach creates more problems than solutions, as 
definitions of responsibility stemming from the observation 
of actors and practitioners are unclear and do not support 
the cause of responsibility. Because defenders of this 
constructivist approach refuse to discuss the normative 
dimensions and requirements of responsibility, this might 
be called a relativistic approach. By contrast, acknowledging 
the polysemic character of responsibility does not evade 
the moral dimension of responsibility and helps to avoid 
an overly narrow and monistic definition, which risks 
becoming idiosyncratic and partial (Reber and Sève, 2006). 
This normative approach is meta-ethical: it goes beyond the 
level of applied ethics, at which a single possible position 
is advocated (Reber, 2011). However, choosing between the 
various aspects of responsibility in specific contexts remains 
an issue.
First, the various meanings of responsibility are not equally 
demanding: attributing a task to an employee or a firm, 
for instance, is not as challenging as assigning him/her a 
role since the latter can include a list of tasks. The level of 
responsibility assigned becomes more demanding when 
capacity is involved: one can achieve a task or play a role 
with low levels of competence or capacity as is the case 
for certain experiments involving PTA, where ordinary 
citizens are selected precisely due to their lack of knowledge 
about the technologies at stake. To achieve responsibility 
understood as capacity, innovation actors need to have 
specific knowledge, the ability to apply it accurately in 
particular contexts and a moral commitment to act in this 
way.
Second, the relevance of a conception of responsibility to 
industrial innovation differs depending on the paradigm 
that is applied. The idea of responsibility as a role assigned 
to each actor, in which various responsibilities are held and 
shared, seems to fit relatively well in a multi-stakeholder 
network conception of innovation. Innovators, venture 
capitalists, incubators, research institutes, policy makers, 
interests groups such as NGOs and end-users are given a 
specific role in the RI process which it is their responsibility 
to achieve as efficiently as possible.
Similarly, when the level of knowledge is reasonable, 
when certain consequences of our actions can be forecast 
and when the social, legal and political environment 
is well known and does not change rapidly, conceiving 
responsibility as a task or capacity can successfully inform 
responsible innovation practices and governance. Assigning 
the responsibility for a project or for a task to somebody 
means that not only must the individual ensure that certain 
outcomes are reached (or avoided), implying repair or 
sanctions in the case of failure (e.g. being dismissed) but 
also that s/he has to engage positively to reach defined 
objectives. These conceptions of responsibility blur the 
forward looking/backward looking distinction that negative 
understanding of responsibility introduces, as they both 
involve an ability to anticipate, to account for one’s own 
actions and to commit oneself to actions and decisions. 
Nevertheless, the attendant uncertainty linked to RI, and the 
impossibility of attributing specific actions and objectives 
to particular agents unambiguously will often make 
responsibility as a task or capacity insufficient, requiring 
more sophisticated interpretations such as responsiveness 
or accountability.
On another level, the idea of virtue, i.e. a form of excellence 
in achieving tasks, roles and in implementing competences 
in particular situations, might be invoked to increase 
the level of moral commitment. However, here again, 
complex (international) supply chains might jeopardize 
any evaluation of the virtue of innovation actors (CEOs, 
designers, researchers, engineers, end-users, etc.). For 
instance, would virtue be adequately assessed in identifying 
actors’ skills through titles, prizes, books or contracts? Can 
excellence in the way of implementing one’s aptitudes be 
evaluated through qualifications – especially when decision 
makers’ competences (gained in business school) are rather 
distant from the core production of their enterprise (e.g. 
civil or chemical engineering)? If, not, how could individual 
virtue be best assessed? Answering these questions requires a 
more complex interaction between individual and collective 
responsibility. In innovation networks, every actor has its 
own responsibility, to be understood here as a role. Partners 
are held responsible for the consequences of their acts, for 
their competence and in some cases for their virtue (as when 
behaving in a more responsible way creates a comparative 
advantage). But what is also needed is that a collective and 
systemic responsibility, which would be one main objective 
of RI, emerges from individual responsible behaviour.
This brief discussion is intended as a first step towards 
a more effective implementation of RI: investigating the 
practical relevance of the various meanings of responsibility 
helps to select and combine them in specific contexts and 
can therefore inform governance and practices of innovation.
6. Conclusion
This paper has explored various meanings of the concept 
of responsibility analysed in moral philosophy. First, 
we have argued that these meanings are frequently only 
implicitly invoked in RI literature, which is more inclined 
to depict ingredients and pillars of responsibility than 
to question the normative dimension of it. Second, we 
have claimed that the idea of responsibility developed in 
CSR is useful to RI, in that it provides both a theoretical 
framework to understand networks of responsibility and a 
practical set of norms (e.g. ISO 26000) for the governance 
of innovation. However, we have also claimed that RI 
would benefit from a deeper analysis of the polysemic 
character of responsibility. In RI literature, the meaning 
of responsibility is sometimes reduced to responsiveness 
alone, while ten other understandings are also available, 
which have different practical relevance according to the 
context. Therefore, we have provided a conceptual mapping 
of the various meanings of responsibility and argued 
that RI should connect both negative and legal-oriented 
understandings of responsibility with more positive and 
prospective aspects. Finally, we have initiated an analysis of 
the relevance of certain conceptions of responsibility such 
as task, role and virtue, in the context of supply chains. By 
unveiling the potential and limits of these conceptions, we 
aim to improve the implementation of RI and help RI social 
actors to choose what conception – or what combinations 
of conceptions – best fit the context. Further work is 
now needed to investigate each of these meanings, their 
various combinations and their implications for industrial 
innovation.
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